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Abstract 
In this work, the possibility of cross-border activities between two regions in the framework of 
the investment contract is viewed as optimal allocation problems. The problems of determining 
the optimal proportion of funds to be invested in liquidity and technology are analyzed in two 
different environments. In the first case, we consider a two-region and two-technology 
economy in which both regions possess the same productive technology or project, but a 
different stream of return. While in the second case, we examine an economy where two 
regions (Indonesia and Malaysia) hold different Islamic productive projects with identical 
returns. Allocation models are formulated in terms of investors’ expected utility maximization 
problem under budget constraints with respect to regional and sectoral shocks. It is revealed 
that optimal parameters for liquidity ratio, technological investment profile, and bank 
repayment are analytically characterized by the return of a more productive project and the 
proportion of impatient and patient investors in the region. Even though both cases employ 
different assumptions, they provide the same expressions of optimal parameters. The model 
suggests that cross-border Islamic investment activities between two regions might be realized, 
provided both regions hold productive projects with an identical stream of return. This paper 
also shows that by increasing the lower return of the project approaching the higher return, a 
room for inter-region investment can be created. An analytical framework of an investment 
contract in terms of optimal allocation model is provided. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How should we invest our funds? Making an investment decision can be a tough task as it 
depends on many aspects, such as goal, time frame, and risk appetite. In financial management, 
investment decisions and capital budgeting are interchangeably used, and they refer to the 
allocation of money or other resources at a different time in expectation of economic returns in 
future periods. Due to the nature of uncertainty, an investment decision should be undertaken 
such that it considers lower risk and higher return appetites in the investment portfolio. In 
obtaining the right decisions, many financial planners interweave several techniques in clinical 
and actuarial decision making, i.e., from subjective judgments to mechanical and systematic 
algorithms (Jones, 2014). Any investment decision should be made based on subjective and 
objective factors (Virlics, 2013). 
 
Growing works of research on investment decision behavior vary across dimensions. The first 
strand of the literature emphasizes the mechanical algorithm. Markowitz (1952) provided a 
guideline for selecting the most efficient portfolio based on the mean-variance model. 
Hirshleifer (1958) addressed two-period and multi-period investment problems and solved for 
the optimal scale and investment portfolio through the use of isoquant analysis. Diamond & 
Dybvig (1983) proposed an investment contract that can prevent bank runs and provide optimal 
risk-sharing by converting illiquid assets. Luban (2002) utilized an integrated approach that 
involves the use of Monte Carlo simulation to generate the probability distribution of NPV, 
stochastic dominance criterion to map the risk profiles, and utility theory to perform sensitivity 
analysis under different levels of risk aversion. Wong & Eng (2017) used the framework of the 
new Keynesian DSGE model and a macroeconomic model of shared-responsibility to inspect 
the stability of the Islamic financial contract. It was found that payoff distribution between 
bank and entrepreneur is dependent on the macroeconomic circumference via the 
entrepreneur’s leverage, while that between investors and the bank is endogenous to the bank’s 
capital and leverage. An option game theory course was applied by Wang & Chen (2011) to 
offset the intrinsic limitations of the conventional NPV method in investment decision making 
of a circular economy. Bielecki et al. (2005) exploited the so-called Bellman equations to 
describe the optimal investment pattern in maximizing expected constant relative risk aversion 
utility function. 
 
Another strand of the literature relates to a question of how personal subjective factors 
determine investment decisions. It has been verified by Raut & Kumar (2018) that two groups 
of individual investors, namely experienced and newbie, exhibited different perceptions about 
behavioral factors such as informational cascades, herding, anchoring, and overconfidence in 
investment decision making. Areiqat et al. (2019) also confirmed that overconfidence, loss 
aversion, and herding have an impact on the stock investment decision making. Gill et al. 
(2018) discovered the fact that economic expectations and overconfidence bias have a 
significant influence on the investment decision making process among investors. An 
interesting fact was revealed from extensive survey research conducted by Lan et al. (2018), 
where demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, years of education, occupation, 
investment experience, financial knowledge level, and income, are closely linked to decision 
behaviors. Alshamy (2019) employed structural equation modeling to show that expertise, risk 
aversion, corporate governance, financial information, and experience to be significant 
determinants affecting investment decision making, in addition to gender, age, and financial 
education as moderating variables. A study by Schwarzkopf (2003) revealed that the attraction 
effect, i.e., an effect that occurs in which adding an inferior or irrelevant alternative into an 
existing choice set changes decision maker’s perception due to its ability to increase the 
attractiveness, can influence investment decisions. In investment-based crowdfunding, it was 
found that investors with more extensive social networks invest more as social interactions 
relate closely to asymmetric information reduction. From risk aversion perspective, women 
invest less equity as the riskiest investments but more in bonds as safer ones (Herve et al. 2019). 
 
On the other hand, a persistent-increasing trend of international economic integration has not 
only led to a broader and richer discussion on how investors should invest their funds across 
existing investment instruments and period but also on how investors optimally allocate their 
money across regions/countries. For instance, Nicoletti et al. (1976) discussed the resource 
allocation of investment between two regions with different characteristics in the economy 
within the framework of optimal control problems. A macroeconomic model was developed to 
determine optimal proportions of investment in each region that maximize social welfare 
criterion, i.e., the capital stock and the social consumptions, subject to dynamical state 
equations of production. Beyond its simplicity, an approach involving only two economies has 
proved pivotal in spatial economic modeling as it can provide detailed analysis results. Fecht, 
Gruner, and Hartmann (2012) exploited an optimal investment allocation model between two 
regions with different specializations to illustrate the risks and benefits of financial integration. 
They argued that by diversifying risk, banks, which are one of the industries in the financial 
sector, can further enhance the resilience of their financial systems to shocks. Allen and Gale 
(2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) also utilized an optimal investment allocation 
model to demonstrate that financial integration through the interbank market allows the 
diversification of regional liquidity shocks efficiently while entailing the risk of financial 
contagion between banks from different regions. 
 
Furthermore, voluminous works of research also illustrated the benefits and risks of financial 
integration. Choi and Cook (2011) also emphasized the benefits of stabilizing the integration 
of international financial accelerators that help diversify the effects of shocks between 
countries.  The well-known Solow model has been carefully utilized by Gumpert (2019) to 
investigate regional economic disparities between two regions with different characteristics of 
technological acquisition, namely industrial and agricultural regions. It was demonstrated that 
inter-region financial transfers reduce the income gap between the advanced and less developed 
regions. Imbs (2006) also revealed that a financially integrated economy has a relatively 
stronger business movement. Cooperation between countries in the financial sector not only 
has an impact on reducing the risk of the impact of the crisis but also increases the openness of 
a country to other countries in the economic aspect, which reduces the role of government. 
 
In this paper, we strive to encompass the previous works of literature in several crucial ways. 
First, this paper extends the optimal investment allocation model between two regions to not 
only explain a condition in which financial integration is possible (Allen and Gale, 2000; 
Freixas et al., 2000 Fecht et al.,  2012) but also exploit the model to illustrate a condition in 
which financial integration may not be possible between these regions. While Fecht et al.  
(2012) assumed that the two regions have their specialization on a particular investment 
instrument, it may not always be the case under certain circumstances. For instance, in regions 
with Islamic banking, Mudaraba (i.e., profit-sharing and loss-bearing) is known as a more 
productive project than Murabaha (i.e., cost-plus). However, mudaraba burdens the Islamic 
bank with a higher transactional cost as it contains more risks (Abdullah and Chee, 2014). In 
this case, the cost may be higher in poor and emerging economies as the investors should 
engage closely and frequently to the project they invest in order to avoid loss of the projects. 
Therefore, the net return provided by mudaraba may generally lower than Murabaha. In the 
case of Mudaraba, we can find many similar phenomenon moreover in the emerging countries 
like Indonesia and Malaysia – the countries we use as the samples in this research. In Indonesia, 
sometimes the banks as investor’s representatives should pay more costs to give trainings and 
frequent surveillance to their respected project’s investors. Besides, we also provide some 
recommendation to translate the non-financially-integrated regions to financially-integrated; 
therefore, leads to a specific region’s specialization.  
 
By extending the mathematical approach developed by Fecht et al.  (2012), this paper explicitly 
examines decision making process in an investment contract between the bank and an investor 
in an economy consisting of two regions where cross-border activities may be conducted under 
uncertainty of the timing of project cash-flow realization due to shocks. We consider two 
different scenarios of investment contract to analyze the bank investment decision making in 
short-term liquidity and long-term projects. In the first case, two regions have similar 
productive projects but a different stream of returns. For the second case, two regions have 
different islamic productive projects but an identical stream of returns.  
 
Under the assumption that the bank invests only in productive projects, it has been revealed 
that at the optimal level, both cases provide the same amounts of liquidity ratio, contract 
repayment, and expected utility. In the first case, it suggests that funds devoted to financing 
long-term projects should all be invested in productive projects in the same region of banks. 
While in the second case, the bank has the flexibility to invest the funds not only in productive 
projects in the same region but also in another region as cross-border activities are allowed in 
this case. This paper also shows that by increasing the lower return of the project approaching 
the higher return, a room for inter-region investment can be created. Cross-border activities 
thus can be seen as incentives for integration between the two economies.  
 
Recall that this paper shed light on the possibility of integration between two regions in the 
framework of the investment contract is viewed as optimal allocation problems. The model 
suggests that integration between two regions might be realized provided both regions hold 
productive projects with an identical stream of return. Therefore, it also implies that, for the 
banking sectors, this paper could provide a framework to calculate optimum allocation. For the 
policymakers, this paper gives an academic-basis analysis for the policymaking in banking 
sectors. For the academic environment, this paper induces the academicians to develop studies 
concerning the optimum allocation, financial integration, and development of banking model 
with other relevant scenarios. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After some introduction and literature review in 
the previous section, we provide in Section 2 the description of the investment model under 
consideration. In Section 3, we present our findings on the optimal investment decision and 
discuss some implications. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
2. The Investment Model 
 
To depict the uncertainty of optimal investment contract between a financial intermediary, i.e., 
the bank, and an investor, we adopt the so-called Diamond-Dybvig model on liquidity demand 
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) and revisit an allocation model with integrated bank developed by 
Fecht et al. (2012). Investment contracts in an open economy or sector which consists of 
households as investors and banks as financial intermediary is considered within three periods 
of time: 𝑡0, 𝑡1, 𝑡2. The economy is divided into two regions, namely region 𝐴 (Indonesia) and 
region 𝐶 (𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑎), where in each region there are only two illiquid investment projects or 
technologies, namely project 𝑅 (𝑀𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑎) and project 𝑆 (𝑀𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑎ℎ𝑎). Project 𝑅 promises 
investors a return of 𝑅𝐴 > 1 per unit invested if it is run in region 𝐴 and 𝑅𝐶 > 1 if it is run in 
region 𝐶, while project 𝑆 provides returns 𝑆𝐴 > 1 and 𝑆𝐶 > 1 per unit invested, respectively. 
 
2.1 Investors 
 
Investors are ex ante identical and assumed to be risk neutral, i.e. they are indifferent to the 
choices of investment projects that provide the same return, but one project may be riskier (i.e. 
Mudaraba). Investors invest their entire 𝑡0 endowment, 1 per investor, and they have no further 
resources at periods 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. Toward their preference in investment, investors are divided into 
two groups, namely impatient and patient investors. The former is an investor that will leave 
the project in the event of late payment due to shocks in the period 𝑡1 and choose to invest in a 
private investment with a marginal utility of 𝑋. The later chooses to wait until the period 𝑡2 
with marginal utility of 1, assuming that 𝑋 > 1. In other words, impatient investors invest at 𝑡1 only, while patient investors invest at either 𝑡1 or 𝑡2. Impatient investors is assumed to 
dominate the economy with a proportion of 𝑟 > 1/2. Thus, the proportion of patient investors 
is equal to (1 − 𝑟) < 1/2. We assume that investors have the same expected utility toward 
investment return, namely 𝐸𝑈(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2, with 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 representing the expected 
returns earned in periods 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
2.2 Banks 
 
There is only one bank in each region and they operate in their respective regions. Banks are 
allowed to make cross-border activities. In period 𝑡0, investors deposit their fund and bank 
invests the funds into short-term liquid activity, i.e., liquidity, and/or long-term illiquid 
projects. Investment in liquidity yields 1 per unit invested and long-term project yields either 𝑆𝐴, 𝑆𝐶 , 𝑅𝐴, or 𝑅𝐵 at period 𝑡2, and nothing at period 𝑡1. Banks are competitive and offer contracts 
to investors to maximize their expected utility. The contract promises payments of 𝛿1 at period 𝑡1 to impatient investors and a late payment of 𝛿2 at period 𝑡2 to patient investors. However, if 
bank has not enough funds to repay 𝛿1 and 𝛿2, then all investors exit from contract and 
withdraw their money at 𝑡1. In this case, the bank will be liquidated. Since there exists liquidity 
risk due to uncertainty over the time of the payment of contracts, it is possible for bank to invest 
funds in a storage technology. 
 
2.3 Shocks 
 
The existence of financial integration enables the diversification of probability and the potential 
for financial contagion due to shocks in regions. We assume that the economy is at risk of two 
types of shocks, namely sectoral and regional shocks. If sectoral shocks attack either project 𝑅 
or project 𝑆, then the respective project in both region 𝐴 and region 𝐶 will be affected. If 
regional shocks attack either region 𝐴 or region 𝐶, then both projects 𝑅 and 𝑆 in the respective 
region will be affected. Payment of the return on the project affected by shocks will be delayed, 
i.e., it is paid at period 𝑡2. The probability distribution of sectoral and regional shocks is detailed 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Probability distribution of shock (Fecht et al., 2012) 
 
State (𝑅𝐴; 𝑆𝐴) (𝑆𝐴; 𝑅𝐴) (0; 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑆𝐴) (𝑅𝐶 ; 𝑆𝐶) 𝑝 0 𝑞 (𝑆𝐶 ; 𝑅𝐶) 0 𝑝 𝑞 (0; 𝑅𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶) 𝑞 𝑞 0 
 
In Table 1, the rows represent region 𝐶, while the columns represent region 𝐴. We denote by (𝑅𝐶; 𝑆𝐶) a state where the return of project 𝑅 in region 𝐶, namely 𝑅𝐶, is paid at 𝑡1, while the 
payment of return of project 𝑆 in region 𝐶, namely 𝑆𝐶, is delayed (due to sectoral shocks) so 
that it is paid for in period 𝑡2. Notations (𝑆𝐶; 𝑅𝐶), (𝑅𝐴; 𝑆𝐴), and (𝑆𝐴; 𝑆𝐴) should be similarly 
interpreted. We denote by (0; 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑆𝐴) a state where a regional shock attacks region 𝐴 such 
that the payment of returns of projects 𝑅 and 𝑆, which is equal to 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑆𝐴 in total, experiences 
delay and is paid for in period 𝑡2. There is no payment in period 𝑡1. Notation (0; 𝑅𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶) is 
interpreted similarly. 
 
Therefore, the (1,1)-th element of the table indicates that there is a probability 𝑝 for project 𝑆  
to be hit by sectoral shocks so that the payments of project 𝑆 contract in both regions are 
deferred to period 𝑡2, while it is carried out at 𝑡1 for unaffected project 𝑅. The (2,2)-th element 
illustrates the situation of project 𝑅 hit by sectoral shocks with probability 𝑝. The (1,3)-th and (2,3)-th elements assume that there is a probability of 𝑞 for region 𝐴 to be hit by regional 
shocks so that the payments for projects 𝑅 and 𝑆 projects in region 𝐴 are late and thus are 
carried at period 𝑡2, while only one project is late in region 𝐶 due to sectoral shocks. The (3,1)-
th and (3,2)-th elements assume that there is a probability of 𝑞 that region 𝐵 is affected by 
regional shocks. Meanwhile, elements (1,2)-th and (2,1)-th show no possibility of sectoral 
shocks occur with partial effects, and element (3,3)-th explains that it is not possible for 
regional shocks to attack both regions simultaneously. Since Table 1 considers all the states 
that might occur, thus it is satisfied that 
 2𝑝 + 4𝑞 = 1. (1) 
 
3. Findings 
 
3.1 Optimal allocation problem 
 
We mean by optimal allocation problem, a problem dealt with by the bank in determining 
proportion of funds to be invested in storage technology, i.e., liquidity, and projects. Instead of 
considering an ideal situation as discussed in Fecht et al. (2012), we devise a two-region 
economy where the same project is more productive than another in both regions, but with 
different return. In particular we consider projects 𝑅 (mudaraba) and 𝑆 (murabaha) in regions 𝐴 (Indonesia) and 𝐶 (Malaysia) where 
 𝑆𝐴 > 𝑆𝐶 , 𝑅𝐴 > 𝑅𝐶 , 𝑆𝐴 > 𝑅𝐴, 𝑆𝐶 > 𝑅𝐶 . (2) 
 
By (2) we assume project 𝑆 (murabaha) is more productive in term of net return than project 𝑅 
(mudaraba) in both regions 𝐴 (Indonesia) and 𝐶 (𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑎) However, this project promises 
different stream of return with respect to regions: project 𝑆 provides a higher return if 
implemented in region 𝐴 (Indonesia) than in region 𝐶. (𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑎). The last assumption 
applies also to project 𝑅. This environment is commonly found in most regions with some 
member countries which implement Islamic banking like Indonesia (A) and Malaysia (C), 
where mudaraba (profit-sharing and loss-bearing) is known as a less productive project than 
murabaha (cost-plus). It is because mudaraba has higher transaction cost than murabaha, 
mudaraba’s net return in most cases is lower than murabaha’s one. Yet the return provided by 
murabaha/mudaraba varies between countries.  
 
Let assume that we are in region 𝐴. Suppose that local bank invests funds in liquidity with 
proportion 𝑘 and in projects with proportion 1 − 𝑘 and it is assumed that bank invests only in 
more productive project, i.e., project 𝑆 in region 𝐴 with proportion 𝛼 and project 𝑆 in region 𝐶 
with proportion 1 − 𝛼. The repayment to investors with respect to shocks is described in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2. Repayment with respect to shocks to project 𝑆 
 
Element 
Shock 
Probability 
Repayment 𝐴 𝐶 𝑡1 𝑡2 (1,3) RS SS 𝑞 𝑟𝑋𝑘 𝛼𝑆𝐴(1 − 𝑘) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑘) (2,3) RS × 𝑞 𝑟𝑋𝑘 𝛼𝑆𝐴(1 − 𝑘) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑘) (1,1) SS SS 𝑝 𝑟𝑋𝛿1 (1 − 𝑟) ⋅ 1 ⋅ 𝛿2 (2,2) × × 𝑝 𝑟𝑋𝛿1 (1 − 𝑟) ⋅ 1 ⋅ 𝛿2 (3,1) SS RS 𝑞 𝑟𝑋𝛿1 (1 − 𝑟) ⋅ 1 ⋅ 𝛿2 
(3,2) × RS 𝑞 𝑟𝑋𝛿1 (1 − 𝑟) ⋅ 1 ⋅ 𝛿2 
RS: regional shock, SS: sectoral shock, ×: no shock 
 
Regional shock will affect all projects in a region and force impatient investors out of contract. 
If regional shock attacks region 𝐴, then the bank will be liquidated and will be only able to 
repay its impatient investors per capita liquidity holding 𝑘. If sectoral shock hits project 𝑆, the 
bank can still repay 𝛿1 to impatient investors in period 𝑡1 and 𝛿2 to patient investors in period 𝑡2. Thus, based on Table 2, the investors’ expected return at periods 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 are given by 
 𝑐1 = 2𝑞𝑟𝑋𝑘 + (2𝑝 + 2𝑞)𝑟𝑋𝛿1. (3) 𝑐2 = 2𝑞(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)(1 − 𝑘) + (2𝑝 + 2𝑞)(1 − 𝑟)𝛿2. (4) 
 
Recall that impatient investors may earn a marginal utility of 𝑋 by accepting a private 
investment after leaving the contract and patient investors may reserve a marginal utility of 1 
by waiting up to period 𝑡2. 
 
Total investors’ expected utility 𝐸𝑈 should be maximized is then constructed by augmenting 
expected returns in (3) and (4) as follow: 
 𝐸𝑈 = 2𝑞𝑟𝑋𝑘 + 2𝑞(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)(1 − 𝑘) + (2𝑝 + 2𝑞)(𝑟𝑋𝛿1 + (1 − 𝑟)𝛿2). (5) 
 
Maximization of expected utility (5) must be carried out under the budget constraints, namely 
the repayment for impatient and patient investors in both regions do not exceed the liquidity 
plus half of cash-flow: 
 𝑟𝛿1 ≤ 12𝛼𝑆𝐴(1 − 𝑘) + 12(1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑘) + 𝑘, (6) (1 − 𝑟)𝛿2 ≤ 12𝛼𝑆𝐴(1 − 𝑘) + 12(1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑘). (7) 
 
To reduce possibility impatient investors leave the economy early in period 𝑡1, the bank 
maximizes investors’ expected utility by increasing as much as possible the short-term 
repayment, such that we may set 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿, and thus inequality budget constraints (6) and 
(7) can be replaced by their corresponding equality constraints: 
 𝑟𝛿 = 12(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)(1 − 𝑘) + 𝑘, (8) (1 − 𝑟)𝛿 = 12(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)(1 − 𝑘). (9) 
 
The optimal allocation problem is then defined as follows: find liquidity holding 𝑘, repayment 𝛿, and ratio 𝛼 such that maximize the investors’ expected utility (5) in accordance with budget 
constraints (8) and (9). 
 
3.2 Solution 
 
Optimal allocation problem comprises two equality constraints and contains three unknown 
parameters 𝑘, 𝛿, and 𝛼, and therefore can be solved by elimination. Since we have only equality 
constraints then any two parameters will always solve the optimization problem. Division (8) 
and (9) eliminates 𝛿 and then produces 
 
𝑟1 − 𝑟 = 1 + 2𝑘(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)(1 − 𝑘). 
 
By solving the above equation for 𝑘, we obtain the optimal liquidity ratio 𝑘∗, i.e., proportion 
of funds should be invested in liquidity such that maximized the investors’ expected utility: 
 𝑘∗(𝛼) = (2𝑟 − 1)(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶). (10) 
 
From (8) and (9) we may write 𝑟𝛿 = (1 − 𝑟)𝛿 + 𝑘, and hence we obtain the optimal repayment 
by the bank as follows: 
 𝛿1∗(𝛼) = 𝛿2∗(𝛼) = 𝛿∗(𝛼) = 𝑘∗2𝑟 − 1, (11) 
 
where 𝑘∗ is given by (10). Since 𝑟 ∈ (0,1), 𝛼 ∈ [0,1], 𝑆𝐴 > 0, and 𝑆𝐶 > 0, then it can be easily 
verified that 𝑘∗ ∈ [0,1]. Obviously, expressions for 𝑘∗ in (10) and for 𝛿∗ in (11) still depend 
on an undetermined parameter 𝛼. Liquidity ratio 𝑘∗ and repayment 𝛿∗ are always optimal since 
they satisfy the equality constraints (8) and (9). 
 
Some interesting facts may be drawn from (10) and (11): 
1. We may further write (10) as 
 𝑘∗(𝛼) = 𝑘1 + 𝑘2𝛼𝑘3 + 𝑘2𝛼, 
 
where 𝑘1 = (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐶 , 𝑘2 = (2𝑟 − 1)(𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶), and 𝑘3 = 2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐶 . The 
effect of proportion 𝛼 on the liquidity ratio and repayment can be identified by facts that 
 𝜕𝑘∗(𝛼)𝜕𝛼 = 𝑘2(𝑘3 − 𝑘1)(𝑘3 + 𝑘2𝛼)2 > 0, (12) 𝜕𝛿∗(𝛼)𝜕𝛼 = 12𝑟 − 1 𝜕𝑘∗(𝛼)𝜕𝛼 > 0. (13) 
 
Based on (12) and (13) it can be stated that if we increase the portion of funds invested to 
productive project with higher return, i.e., increase 𝛼, then local bank should reserve more 
funds for liquidity and in the same time promises higher repayment to investors, i.e., 
increase 𝑘∗ and 𝛿∗. 
2. It is assumed in the beginning that project 𝑆 commits higher return if conducted in region 𝐴 than in region 𝐶, i.e., 𝑆𝐴 > 𝑆𝐶 . What happen if region 𝐶 may exhibit better improvement 
such that 𝑆𝐶 approaching 𝑆𝐴? We have the followings: 
 lim𝑆𝐶→𝑆𝐴 𝑘∗(𝛼) = (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴, (14) lim𝑆𝐶→𝑆𝐴 𝛿∗(𝛼) = 𝑆𝐴2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴. (15) 
 
The right-hand sides of (14) and (15) can be seen as the more competitive level of liquidity 
ratio and contract repayment. As 𝑆𝐶 tends to 𝑆𝐴, the bank has more options for investing 
funds to projects with similar return. 
 
With 𝑘∗ and 𝛿∗ are given in (10) and (11), the optimal value of 𝛼 can be specified by 
substituting them into expected utility (5) and then performing the first order condition of 
optimization.  We firstly have 
 𝐸𝑈 = 2(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)((3𝑞 + 𝑝)(1 − 𝑟) + 𝑟𝑋(2𝑞𝑟 + 𝑝))2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶) . (16) 
 
Again we can easily verify that 𝐸𝑈 is a non-negative quantity. Note that expression (16) can 
be rewritten as a function of 𝛼 as follows: 
 𝐸𝑈(𝛼) = 𝑚1 + 𝑚2𝛼𝑛1 + 𝑛2𝛼 , 
 
where 
 𝑚1 = 2𝑆𝐶((3𝑞 + 𝑝)(1 − 𝑟) + 𝑟𝑋(2𝑞𝑟 + 𝑝)), 𝑚2 = 2((3𝑞 + 𝑝)(1 − 𝑟) + 𝑟𝑋(2𝑞𝑟 + 𝑝))(𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶), 𝑛1 = 2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐶 , 𝑛2 = (2𝑟 − 1)(𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶). 
 
By using simple calculus we may obtain the first partial derivative of 𝐸𝑈 with respect to 
parameter 𝛼 as follows, 
 𝜕𝐸𝑈(𝛼)𝜕𝛼 = 𝑚2𝑛1 − 𝑚1𝑛2(𝑛1 + 𝑛2𝛼)2 . 
 
Since 𝑚2𝑛1 − 𝑚1𝑛2 = 4(1 − 𝑟)(𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶)((3𝑞 + 𝑝)(1 − 𝑟) + 𝑟𝑋(2𝑞𝑟 + 𝑝)) > 0 by fact 
that 𝑆𝐴 > 𝑆𝐶 as assumed in (2), then we conclude 
 𝜕𝐸𝑈(𝛼)𝜕𝛼 > 0. (17) 
 
The above condition reveals that the investors’ expected utility 𝐸𝑈 is a monotonically 
increasing function with respect to 𝛼. It means that a larger 𝛼 will contribute a bigger 𝐸𝑈. As 
the bank wants to maximize 𝐸𝑈, thus 𝛼 should be selected as large as possible. Since 𝛼 is 
defined as the proportion of funds invested in project 𝑆 in region 𝐴 and thus 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1, then 
the optimal value of 𝛼 is given by 
 𝛼∗ = 1, (18) 
 
suggesting that funds allocated for project must all be used to finance project 𝑆 in region 𝐴. 
Furthermore, with 𝛼∗ = 1 we may then strengthen the expression of optimal liquidity ratio (10) 
and that of optimal repayment 𝛿∗ (11) respectively as follow: 
 
𝑘∗ = (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴, (19) 𝛿∗ = 𝑆𝐴2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴, (20) 
 
which show that optimal parameters mainly characterized by the return of project 𝑆 in region 𝐴 and the proportion of impatient investors in the population. We also have the maximum 
investors’ expected utility by substituting (18) into (16): 
 𝐸𝑈∗ = 2𝑆𝐴((3𝑞 + 𝑝)(1 − 𝑟) + 𝑟𝑋(2𝑞𝑟 + 𝑝))2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴 . (21) 
 
Note that expressions in (19) and (20) are exactly the same with those of (14) and (15). 
Liquidity ratio (19) and repayment (20) are derived by optimization process in the framework 
of allocation problem under budget constraints. Those of (14) and (15) are obtained by equating 
budget constraints and then changing the assumption from 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐴 to 𝑆𝐶 = 𝑆𝐴. Even if cases 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐴 and 𝑆𝐶 = 𝑆𝐴 suggest the same policies on liquidity and repayment, both offer distinct 
environments for integration. The former case recommends local bank to fully invest its funds 
in own region. The latter case, however, advises local bank to expand its business by financing 
project out of region. We refer case of two productive projects with identical return to a realistic 
environment for integration. 
 
3.3 A realistic case 
 
Our previous analysis shows that economic integration will not be realized when the two 
regions possess the same flagship project but offer different stream of returns. This fact, 
however, can be easily understood. If regions 𝐴 and 𝐶 have the same project 𝑆 as their flagship, 
but it promises a higher return whenever run in region 𝐴 than region 𝐶, then local bank in 
region 𝐴 will only invest its funds in own region. There is no incentive for the bank to invest 
its funds in region 𝐶 as it will reduce the repayment. In this situation an integration is 
impossible to be realized. 
 
Let’s consider a more ideal situation, where productive projects in both regions offer exactly 
the same level of return. More precisely, we consider an economy with two regions 𝐴 and 𝐵 
and two projects 𝑆 and 𝑅. In region 𝐴, project 𝑆 is more productive than project 𝑅, and in region 𝐵, project 𝑅 is more productive than project 𝑆. Both productive projects offer the same return 
and both inferior projects promise the same return. In other words, we assume 
 𝑆𝐴 = 𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑆𝐵 , 𝑆𝐴 > 𝑆𝐵, 𝑅𝐴 < 𝑅𝐵 . (22) 
 
This ideal case, which has been discussed in Fecht et al. (2012), proposes some sort of 
flexibility to invest. The bank may also invest funds in project 𝑅 in region 𝐵, in addition to 
project 𝑆 in region 𝐴. This setting, however, offers more room for integration between regions. 
 
Instead of rigorously derived from beginning, we utilized some expressions in the previous 
case. We now denote by 𝑙 the proportion of funds to be invested in liquidity. Out of 1 − 𝑙 of 
the available funds for financing project, some will be used for funding project 𝑆 in region 𝐴 
with proportion 𝛽 and the rest 1 − 𝛽 will be devoted for financing project 𝑅 in region 𝐵. We 
also denote by 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 repayments in periods 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, respectively. By rearranging (5) we 
may have the following investors’ expected utility to be maximized 
 ℰ𝒰 = 2𝑞𝑟𝑋𝑙 + 2𝑞(𝛽𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑅𝐵)(1 − 𝑙) + (2𝑝 + 2𝑞)(𝑟𝑋𝑑1 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑑2). (23) 
 
We can simplify (23) by applying 𝑆𝐴 = 𝑅𝐵 as assumed in (22) to get the following: 
 ℰ𝒰 = 2𝑞𝑟𝑋𝑙 + 2𝑞𝑆𝐴(1 − 𝑙) + (2𝑝 + 2𝑞)(𝑟𝑋𝑑1 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑑2). (24) 
 
Note that we no longer have a parameter 𝛽 in (23). This means funds allocation for project 𝑆 
in region 𝐴 and project 𝑅 in region 𝐵 can be loosely decided as they have identical returns. In 
much the same way, we have also a set of budget constraints from (8)-(9): 
 𝑟𝑑 = 12𝑆𝐴(1 − 𝑙) + 𝑙, (25) (1 − 𝑟)𝑑 = 12𝑆𝐴(1 − 𝑙). (26) 
 
By dividing (25) and (26) we find the optimum value of liquidity ratio and repayment, 
respectively as follow: 
 𝑙∗ = (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴(2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴 + 2(1 − 𝑟), (27) 𝑑1∗ = 𝑑2∗ = 𝑑∗ = 𝑙∗2𝑟 − 1 = 𝑆𝐴(2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴 + 2(1 − 𝑟). (28) 
 
Note again that (27) and (28) can be reclaimed by applying condition 𝑆𝐶 = 𝑅𝐵 and then 𝑅𝐵 =𝑆𝐴 into (10) and (11), respectively, with understanding that project 𝑆 in region 𝐶 is now project 𝑅 in region 𝐵. Direct comparison of (10) and (27) provides 
 𝑘∗(𝛼) − 𝑙∗ = −2(2𝑟 − 1)(1 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑆𝐴(2𝑟 − 1) + 2(1 − 𝑟))(2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)(𝛼𝑆𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑆𝐶)). 
 
Since 
12 < 𝑟 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1, 𝑆𝐴 > 𝑆𝐶 , then 𝑘∗(𝛼) − 𝑙∗ ≤ 0, and thus we have the following 
relationships: 
 𝑘∗(𝛼) ≤ 𝑙∗, (29) 𝛿∗(𝛼) ≤ 𝑑∗. (30) 
 
At optimal level, i.e., 𝛼 = 1, again we can show that the liquidity ratio and repayment in both 
cases are the same, i.e., 𝑘∗ = 𝑙∗ and 𝛿∗ = 𝑑∗. 
 
If we substitute (27) and (28) into (24), the we have the maximum investors’ expected utility 
for ideal case 
 ℰ𝒰∗ = 2𝑆𝐴((3𝑞 + 𝑝)(1 − 𝑟) + 𝑟𝑋(2𝑞𝑟 + 𝑝))2(1 − 𝑟) + (2𝑟 − 1)𝑆𝐴 , (31) 
  
and again (31) is exactly the same with that of previous case given in (21). These facts reveal 
that even though we consider different environments, one without incentive for integration and 
one promotes integration, both cases recommend exactly the same way of funds allocation and 
contract repayments. 
 
Furthermore, for both cases we also have the followings: 
 𝑑𝑘∗𝑑𝑆𝐴 = 𝑑𝑙∗𝑑𝑆𝐴 = 2𝑞 − 1(2(1 − 𝑞) + (2𝑞 − 1)𝑆𝐴)2 > 0, (32) 𝑑𝛿∗ 𝑑𝑆𝐴 = 𝑑𝑑∗𝑑𝑆𝐴 = 1(2(1 − 𝑞) + (2𝑞 − 1)𝑆𝐴)2 > 0, (33) 
 
which assert that the liquidity ratio and repayment are increasing with respect to project return. 
If the return of project increase, then the bank can pay more to investors but at the same time 
it should invest more funds to storage technology liquidity? 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We have examined an allocation problem of investment contract in two-region economy. Two 
different conditions of contract were considered to analyze the bank investment decision 
making in short-term liquidity and long-term projects. In the first case, two regions (Indonesia 
and Malysia) have similar productive projects but different stream of returns. While in the 
second case, two regions have different productive projects but identical stream of returns. 
Under assumption that the bank invests only in productive projects, it has been revealed the 
following facts: 
1. In the optimal level, both cases provide exactly the same amounts of liquidity ratio, contract 
repayment and expected utility. The first two parameters are entirely determined by the 
return of productive project and the ratio of impatient and patient investors. The expression 
of maximal expected utility depends also on the probability of shock and the marginal 
utility of private investment. 
2. In the first case, it is suggested that funds devoted to financing long-term project should all 
be invested in productive project in the same region of bank. While in the second case, the 
bank has flexibility to invest the funds not only in productive project in the same region but 
also in another region as cross-border activities are allowed in this case. 
3. In order to promote the similar room of cross-border activities, it is recommended for region 
with lower project’s return to increase the return such that it has a comparable return.  
Cross-border activities can be seen as incentives for integration between the two 
economies. The increase in return will be followed by an increase in repayment by bank, 
although in this situation bank must raise the portion of funds invested in liquidity. 
4. The result that the equality in return may open the possibility of cross-border risk sharing 
shows that there is a potential advantage from government intervention into interbank 
markets implementation. 
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